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REMEDIES: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 
DOUG RENDLEMAN* 
“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” 
 -Archilochus 
INTRODUCTION 
I wrote this modest effort for the edification of anyone who is puzzled 
about the law school course in Remedies, including, but not limited to, a law 
student, a law dean, and, its primary audience, a beginning or experienced law 
teacher. I based it on several perplexed decades of teaching and writing about 
Remedies. 
I will begin by identifying the reason I am perplexed. Archilochus, 
famously quoted by Isaiah Berlin in The Hedgehog and the Fox, wrote that 
“[t]he fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.”1 
Archilochus referred to the fox’s wide variety of ideas versus the hedgehog’s 
single defining idea. The starting point for our study is that Remedies is the 
law of Archilochus’s fox. 
To illustrate my point about the foxlike variability of Remedies, let’s take a 
little step outside our subject and summarize the context for Remedies. The 
United States lacks a single private law appellate court. The United States 
Supreme Court limits itself to federal issues. This may be just as well, because 
when it deals with a federal issue in Remedies, the Court has been at best 
confusing, as in contempt,2 and at worst, wrongheaded and regressive, as in 
punitive damages.3 
 
* Huntley Professor, Washington and Lee School of Law. Thanks to the Saint Louis University 
Law Journal and its staff for planning this top-notch symposium and for helping me to bring this 
Article to print. I wrote this Article in the summer of 2012 after an excellent experience with my 
spring semester Washington and Lee Remedies class, and I thank those students for improving 
these modest efforts. Thanks also to the Frances Lewis Law Center for supporting my 2012 
summer research and writing. 
 1. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE FOX: AN ESSAY ON TOLSTOY’S VIEW OF 
HISTORY 1 (1953). 
 2. See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Margit 
Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 WASH. L. REV. 345, 390–99 (2000); Jayne S. 
Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
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Each state in the Union and each separate jurisdiction has a legislature and 
a court with the final appellate word over its constitutional, statutory, and 
common law of remedies. The states’ legal cultures differ. The business 
community ranks the states from plaintiff-favoring “Judicial Hellholes” like 
West Virginia to its safer neighbor to the east, Virginia.4 Many basic remedies 
issues sport parallel lines of contradictory authority. The canny plaintiffs’ 
lawyer might reverse the business community’s hierarchy, perhaps using their 
list of “Judicial Hellholes” to pick a friendly venue. 
To alter Tip O’Neill’s aphorism only slightly, all remedies are local. Local 
legal or courthouse cultures vary widely. Lexington, where I work, is the 
county seat of rural Rockbridge County, Virginia. The courthouse sees very 
few jury trials. When trials do occur, defense verdicts are not unusual. When 
they favor a plaintiff, Rockbridge County juries are notoriously “tightfisted,” 
often returning verdicts for medical expenses and wages only, hence, no pain 
and suffering in Rockbridge County. So far back as memory runs, there have 
been no jury verdicts in Rockbridge County for punitive damages.5 In 2012, a 
young man’s wrongful death, which would probably have settled for around $1 
million in St. Louis where this Article is published, brought the startlingly low 
Rockbridge jury’s verdict of $100,000.6 
Litigated lawsuits, and even more so those that are appealed, are the visible 
tip of an almost invisible iceberg of disputes that are settled either without 
lawsuits or with lawsuits that are settled without trial. These are negotiated and 
settled in the local courthouse culture in the shadow of the state’s common and 
statutory law, often for “an undisclosed sum.” A lawyer advancing a client’s 
interest in an adversary system lacks any abiding interest in developing a 
coherent and logical legal system. “[P]ractitioners and judges do not normally 
give a pin for legal development. Their duty is to these clients and the proper 
 
Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor Incarceration in the Modern Age, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 355, 376 (2006). 
 3. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559 (1996); Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for 
Everyone?, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 23 (2009). 
 4. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2012/13 (2012), available 
at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ATRA_JH12_04.pdf. 
 5. Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant’s Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort 
Reform, 39 AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1168–69 (2006). 
 6. Matt Chittum, Jury Finds Lexington Negligent in 2006 Maury River Park Drowning, 
ROANOKE TIMES (July 3, 2012), www.roanoke.com/news/breaking/wb/311122. According to 
judicialhellholes.org, downstate Illinois, just across the Mississippi River from St. Louis, would 
have been even better for the plaintiff’s family. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, supra note 
4, at 3 (ranking Madison County, Illinois third on its list of “Judicial Hellholes”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] REMEDIES: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 569 
disposition of this case.”7 Settlements and almost all unappealed trial court 
decisions fly under the professor’s radar, focused as it is on appellate 
decisions. Empirical studies and statistics of lawsuits and their results, 
remedies, are scarce. The best studies are from Cornell and the National Center 
for State Courts.8 
Remedies teachers are an introspective lot. Only a dozen years ago, they 
published a law review symposium about teaching Remedies in the Brandeis 
Law Journal, which included my modest contribution.9 In the meantime, 
veteran Remedies teacher Otto Stockmeyer favored the field with his advice to 
a Remedies beginner.10 Also, Jeff Berryman wrote about Remedies teaching 
and scholarship from a Canadian Commonwealth perspective.11 Finally, 
Remedies teachers are extremely fortunate to have Professor Douglas 
Laycock’s comprehensive article about their course’s genesis.12 Thanks to the 
Saint Louis University Law Journal for organizing and publishing this splendid 
symposium. 
In the dozen years since Brandeis’s symposium, the United States has 
suffered through a serious recession. Legal education has not escaped. “Legal 
education,” my colleague Ben Spencer began, “is under attack.”13 The critique 
of law school features the charge that law school is not preparing its students 
for law practice.14 This critique focuses my remarks about the Remedies 
course. The truths that appeared to me in 2000 haven’t changed much, but I 
will address them in a different way today. 
 
 7. S. F. C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 77 (2d ed. 1981); 
see also id. at 61 (noting that the transformation of the early common law system was not the aim 
of lawyers at the time). 
 8. For the latest study on this topic, see Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Judge-Jury 
Difference in Punitive Damages Awards: Who Listens to the Supreme Court?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 325 (2011). The Court Statistics Project at the National Center serves as a national 
archive of state court caseload statistics. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING 
THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS (2012), 
available at http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%2 
0PDF/CSP_DEC.ashx. 
 9. Doug Rendleman, Remedies—The Law School Course, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 535 (2001). 
 10. Norman Otto Stockmeyer, An Open Letter to a Colleague Preparing to Teach Remedies, 
12 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 115 (2010). 
 11. Jeffrey Berryman, The Law of Remedies: A Prospectus for Teaching and Scholarship, 10 
OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 123 (2010). 
 12. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LITIG. 161 
(2008). 
 13. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Law School Critique in Historical Perspective, 69 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1949, 1951 (2012). 
 14. See THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 177–216 (2010); 
Kristen Holmquist, Challenging Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 353 (2012); Spencer, supra 
note 13, at 1951–52. 
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I turn to my three major topics, Coverage of Remedies, Remedies in the 
Classroom, and Teaching Remedies Outside the Classroom. 
I.  COVERAGE OF REMEDIES 
To begin with, what topics ought to be included in a course in Remedies? 
The modern law school course in Remedies emerged only in the 1950s 
when legal realists created the modern Remedies course.15 Generally speaking, 
they exited from civil procedure and combined existing courses in Damages, 
Equity, and Restitution into one class on Remedies.16 A lot was gained by 
bringing the related subjects together. Some things were lost—substantive 
equity and substantive unjust enrichment restitution.17 
What do we mean by a remedy? Neither an instructor’s colleagues nor her 
Remedies students will have a firm grasp on that question, which gives an 
instructor freedom and flexibility in choosing what to cover. 
There are some answers, beginning with negative ones. A remedy is 
neither substance nor procedure. The rules the judge or jury applies to 
determine whether the defendant is liable to the plaintiff comprise the 
substantive law. Procedure is the quadrille of steps that the court and the 
litigants take to process a lawsuit. 
Is there a positive definition? In our Remedies vocabulary, a remedy is 
what the court does at the end of a lawsuit for the prevailing plaintiff. A 
remedy is what the court can and will do for the winning plaintiff—and to the 
losing defendant. 
The court’s remedies for a successful plaintiff fall under three major 
headings: damages, equitable remedies, and restitution. In the specialized 
vocabulary of Remedies, damages are compensatory damages. So far as money 
can, compensatory damages put the plaintiff where she would have been if the 
defendant hadn’t violated her rights.18 Punitive damages and legal restitution 
spring from different policy bases; they are money recoveries that aren’t 
compensatory. Punitive damages are taken from the defendant to punish and 
deter.19 Restitution is stripped from the defendant to prevent the defendant’s 
unjust enrichment.20 Other money relief includes attorneys’ fees and interest. 
The Big Three Equitable remedies are the injunction, specific performance, 
and equitable restitution, in particular, the constructive trust. In a Remedies 
course, restitution usually includes a component for the students to grapple 
 
 15. Laycock, supra note 12, at 252. 
 16. Id. at 246. 
 17. See id. 
 18. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 3.1, at 
281 (2d ed. 1993). 
 19. Id. § 3.1, at 283. 
 20. Id. § 4.1(1), at 551–52. 
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with the core concepts of unjustness and enrichment; it also introduces legal 
and equitable restitution remedies and measurement. 
To illustrate arranging the law under the plaintiff’s relief, many Torts 
scholars organize their subject around theories of substantive liability: intent, 
negligence, and strict liability. A Remedies approach to Torts is organized 
under the different headings that stem from the plaintiff’s relief: the preventive 
injunction, compensatory damages based on plaintiff’s loss, disgorgement 
restitution based on defendant’s gain, and punitive damages to punish and 
deter. 
The litigants and the court have two remedies inquiries. First, to select or 
choose which remedy or remedies. For example, should the plaintiff receive 
compensatory damages, an injunction, or both? Second, to measure or define 
the chosen remedy. For example, will the injured plaintiff recover $100,000 or 
$150,000 for her pain and suffering damages? The Remedies course should 
prepare a future lawyer to be alert to the range of remedial options to decide 
which will be most advantageous for a client. 
Remedies is a court-developed common law field like Contract, Tort, 
Property, and Restitution. A statute will govern the successful plaintiff’s 
remedy because courts administer the common law at the sufferance of the 
legislature. Having said that, legislatures often leave courts on their own in 
determining plaintiffs’ remedies, although sometimes the legislature even 
misdirects courts and undermines sound solutions.21 Remedies vary between 
common law, statutory law, and constitutional law; for example, a court will be 
more willing to supervise an injunction that implements the plaintiffs’ 
constitutional right to an education than an injunction or specific performance 
order that enforces a covenant in a shopping-center lease.22 
Two available approaches to a Remedies course are, first, transsubstantive, 
examining each of the remedial categories, and, second, studying remedies in 
substantive categories, wrong-by-wrong—tort, contract, and property. My own 
approach is some of both. This is because I think that, although a common core 
exists and should be studied, the “forms of action” survive in the sense that 
remedies rules in contract, tort, and property differ enough to warrant separate 
analysis. Also, studying remedies in substantive categories requires the 
students to compare and choose remedies. Otto Stockmeyer advised the 
beginner that “a more practice-oriented approach is the study of Remedies 
wrong-by-wrong.”23 
 
 21. See, e.g., Craig Robert Senn, Ending Discriminatory Damages, 64 ALA. L. REV. 187 
(2012). 
 22. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
383 (8th ed. 2011). 
 23. Stockmeyer, supra note 10, at 116. 
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Having identified the basics, I will add that the Remedies course can be 
eclectic. I have taught Remedies out of ten different books, most of them, 
however, my own; but I have never taught Remedies the same way twice. 
Student interest and emphasis changes. Trying out new decisions varies 
coverage. Last spring I started my Remedies course with restitution because 
the prior year I had ended with a forced march through restitution that my 
students thought was both too fast and not enough. The change was, I thought, 
successful. 
Other principal issues about the Remedies course are global. What role 
should history play? Knowing where we were then helps us to understand 
where we are now. Chief Justice Roberts quoted Justice Holmes’s famous 
epigram that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”24 In restitution, 
Moses v. Macferlan is obsolete as a teaching case because of the procedure the 
court followed; but a quotation from Lord Mansfield succeeds as an early 
example of broad restitution leading to a quest for limiting principles.25 
Remedies includes what may be the students’ only careful examination of law, 
chancery, merger, and the modern issue of jury trial. In states like Virginia and 
Delaware where equity is examined on the bar exam,26 Remedies is the law 
school course in equity. 
The puzzle of discretion that runs through Remedies grows out of history. 
Before reformers merged the law and chancery courts, law courts were said to 
apply rigid rules to facts, chancery to deemphasize mechanical decisions in 
favor of contextual decisions based on discretion.27 Although we still hear 
paeans to equitable discretion, the modern Remedies course may productively 
ask its students whether, after merger, the “Chancellor’s” discretion exceeds a 
jury’s measurement of, for example, a personal-injury plaintiff’s pain-and-
suffering damages. 
Distinguishing right and remedy is crucial to the study of Remedies. 
“[T]he creation of a right,” the Supreme Court wrote, “is distinct from the 
provision of remedies for violations of that right.”28 Remedies scholars would 
be more pleased if the distinction between right and remedy did not introduce a 
remedy that is narrower than the right. For although a plaintiff’s remedy is 
 
 24. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). 
 25. See RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 475 (“[T]he gist of this kind of action is, 
that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and 
equity to refund the money.” (quoting Moses v. Macferlan, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 681 (K.B. 1760))). 
 26. See VA. BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS, RULES 1 (2012), available at http://www.vbbe.state. 
va.us/pdf/VBBERules.pdf; BD. OF BAR EXAMINERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF DEL., Board 
RULES 3 (2012), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/BBE/docs/BBERulesv6.pdf. 
 27. See Dobbs, supra note 18, § 2.2, at 67. 
 28. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392. 
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separate from her substantive right, her remedy should advance the substantive 
goal, or at least not frustrate it. 
Working backward, courts and legislatures should develop the substantive 
law rule around the available remedies. After the initial decision choosing the 
plaintiff’s remedy, the judge’s or jury’s measurement and definition of that 
remedy can be contextual and discretionary. 
What role does legal theory play in Remedies? Remedies casebooks 
examine market-economic theory.29 A basic economic insight is that, in 
measuring and shaping a plaintiff’s remedy, a court should avoid an obviously 
wasteful solution. 
Market economics is helpful in Remedies up to a point. The economist’s 
search for the most efficient result is based on seeking the lowest-cost avoider 
and deterrence, signaling incentives to prevent future casualties.30 Deterrence 
is not really connected to the parties’ present litigation or to the plaintiff’s 
actual or potential loss; it is prospective in looking to the future, not 
retrospective, not compensatory for the plaintiff, and not really remedial in the 
sense defined above.31 Finally, economic jargon is inaccessible to lawyers and 
courts that prefer legal reasoning based on values and legal rules. 
Another “school” of legal theory is corrective justice and its variations, as 
opposed to distributive justice. Corrective justice theory maintains that the 
court should deal with the normative imbalance between rights of the 
wrongdoer and rights of the victim.32 I confess that, in Remedies, I haven’t 
been able to make much of corrective justice. Jeffrey Berryman has written to 
my approbation that private law theory has neglected compensation for 
substantive theories like corrective justice. The study and teaching of 
Remedies, he maintains, could restore an imbalance by considering 
compensation in context.33 
In the conventional division between private law and public law, much of 
Remedies as studied falls on what some think of as the private law side. 
Remarking on a personal injury lawsuit, one court wrote that “[o]f course, the 
State does not have any interest in the question of who wins this lawsuit, or the 
extent to which one party prevails over the other.”34 That court’s narrow 
approach should be rejected. A court’s personal injury damages decision 
affects the distribution of wealth, the government’s social welfare budget, the 
 
 29. See, e.g., RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 702–03. 
 30. See Jeffrey Berryman, The Compensation Principle in Private Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 91, 97 (2008). 
 31. Id. Fortunately, Ted White told us that Torts scholars’ “consensus” is that compensation 
prevailed. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 152 
(1980). 
 32. See Berryman, supra note 30, at 100. 
 33. Id. at 127–29. 
 34. Williams v. Bright, 658 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). 
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deterrence value of potential defendants’ standard of care, and the 
jurisdiction’s business climate. A decision reprobating misconduct and setting 
a tortfeasor’s payment to its victim affects its moral climate. “‘We the 
People,’” the late Leon Green wrote, “are a party to every lawsuit and it is our 
interest that weighs most heavily in its determination.”35 
In addition, courts used remedies in the most obvious public law areas. The 
courts in the United States used complex and protracted injunctions to 
desegregate formerly segregated public schools.36 In states with official race 
segregation, the substantive issues were simple, leaving sweeping remedies 
issues.37 
Let’s move from planning the course into the classroom. 
II.  REMEDIES IN THE CLASSROOM 
Remedies, what a winning plaintiff gets, is among the most practice-ready 
and practical courses in a student’s law school experience. A lawyer’s client is 
interested in results, not the procedural and substantive dance to reach those 
results. Remedies is client-centered and outcome-oriented. Remedies make a 
difference in peoples’ lives. In addition, Remedies reviews a student’s first-
year courses, brings them together, and focuses on results. Remedies is a 
capstone course because it brings other courses together around the idea of 
relief. 
The literary movement known as the New Criticism emphasized a close 
reading of fiction and poetry, focus on a self-contained text, and careful 
scrutiny with a dictionary close at hand.38 My English professor a few years 
ago was a New Critic. I think that a law student needs to know what the court 
said before they know what to think about it. A student will learn most of what 
he needs to know from a careful reading of what the court says. I don’t think 
that students learn to read and analyze a court’s remedies decision in their first-
year classes. At some point in the Remedies course, students begin to think 
about, discuss, and argue for alternative remedial solutions that reach different 
results—a crossover has occurred, the remedial lights have come on. 
Law is not a self-contained science. Understanding the solution to a 
client’s problem is larger than the substance in court decisions. A Remedies 
 
 35. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise I, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959); see also 
John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law 
for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524, 581 (2005) (describing the “tort-law-as-public-law 
movement”). 
 36. See Doug Rendleman, Brown II’s “All Deliberate Speed” at Fifty: A Golden 
Anniversary or a Mid-Life Crisis for the Constitutional Injunction as a School Desegregation 
Remedy?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1575, 1595 (2004). 
 37. See id. at 1579–80. 
 38. See Michael Delahoyde, New Criticism, INTRODUCTION TO LITERATURE, http://public. 
wsu.edu/~delahoyd/new.crit.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
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course ought to move beyond doctrine to add a historical and contextual 
dimension. Remedies has ethical, social, and political dimensions. And it’s as 
pragmatic as whether the court can define, measure, and administer a particular 
remedy. 
Remedies can be emotionally draining. Teaching wrongful death has 
always been difficult for me, especially because my casebook combines 
wrongful death with race, social class, gender, and sexual orientation.39 To say 
that these subjects are excruciatingly difficult for law students in their early 
twenties to discuss openly in a class is an understatement. The issues are 
difficult for their instructor as well because I am a parent and I sympathize 
with society’s underdogs, both of which affect my class presentation. 
My Remedies classes are almost all discussion. I regard a lecture by the 
“sage on the stage” as an inefficient method of transferring facts, rules, and 
information.40 Active learning has not always been easy to sell or conduct 
because passivity is easier for many students. I ameliorate my discussion class 
sessions a little by taking volunteers and usually not cold-calling on students. 
This practice has the unfortunate side effect of allowing a passive student to 
remain on the sideline where he doesn’t obtain the self-educating benefit of 
mixing it up with classmates and his professor. 
Classroom discussion of decisions, questions, and problems develops 
alternative solutions and the arguments for each. A Remedies student learns 
the lawyer’s skill of choosing and advocating a client’s “best” solution and 
predicting the result. Discussion classes develop oral communication skills 
because students sharpen their advocacy skills and learn to appreciate the 
human dimension in decision-making. 
In discussion classes, students acquire and rehearse analytical and practical 
skills that they will actually use in law practice and in all other employment 
settings. Their verbal facility will be evaluated from the beginning by more 
senior lawyers, their peers, their judges, and their opponents. The classroom 
provides a low-risk forum for students to cultivate these skills. 
A computer-based lecture can be part of the information transfer that 
occurs before class because a student can remember the content.41 However, 
exclusively online learning, even if “interactive,” will diminish the synergistic 
classroom community of law school learning. It lacks the personal, face-to-
face conversation and interaction that encourages active learning. Coming 
face-to-face to test the information against contradictory ideas occurs in class 
 
 39. RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 52–76. 
 40. See Dan Berrett, How ‘Flipping’ the Classroom Can Improve the Traditional Lecture, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 24, 2012, at A16. 
 41. See Pamela Hieronymi, Don’t Confuse Technology with College Teaching, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC., Aug. 17, 2012, at A19. 
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and conversation. Only then can mature evaluation, reflection, synthesis, and 
organization proceed. 
Students’ use of laptop computers in class has two opposing risks: that a 
student will become a stenographer and be so busy capturing everything that 
he won’t use his mind or, on the other hand, that a student will disengage, tune 
out, and play games or gamble on the stock market. I am willing to assume 
those risks. My students use their laptops in the classroom, a technique that 
will continue in law practice or other employment. I encourage students to use 
their word processor to brief cases, take notes, develop an outline, and write 
their exam. The computer also increases interactivity in class, as students will 
look up cases, Jett Williams’s website,42 and Betty Nestlehutt’s YouTube 
video.43 Handheld electronic devices and gadgets probably moot the laptop 
banners’ case anyway. 
Powerpoint can be overused and overload students with lectures in spoken 
and written forms. Washington and Lee classrooms’ Powerpoint screen is in 
the middle of the classroom with a small stand for the maestro on the far side. 
Although everyone who knows me is aware that I have virtually no ego, I 
haven’t been willing to abandon the middle of my classroom to a Powerpoint 
screen. Students’ cellphones are almost always off, but if a phone rings, I say 
“You answer it; I’m busy trying to teach a class.” It’s usually not a student’s 
phone anyway, but rather, the classroom’s media staff phone. 
Two other skills emerge from Remedies students’ classroom crucible. One 
skill students don’t learn as passive recipients of rule-transfer lectures is the 
ability to use the knowledge about legal rules to solve a problem, to resolve a 
dispute.44 As a first-year Civil Procedure teacher on my days off from 
Remedies, I found that many first-year law students cannot read a statute or 
procedure rule and solve a simple problem. In the upper-level Remedies class, 
actual remedies solutions are specific, and they force students to put the rules 
in operation. Discussion of remedies helps students learn to apply their abstract 
knowledge. 
A student’s routine legal reasoning moves from rule to result. More 
sophisticated reasoning moves from policy justification, to rule, to result.45 The 
 
 42. JETT WILLIAMS, http://www.jettwilliams.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). Students may 
choose to visit the site when we cover Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 43. We the People—Challenging Georgia’s Malpractice Caps, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFKS3FrRUe4. Students become familiar with Ms. 
Nestlehutt’s story when they read Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 
218 (Ga. 2010). 
 44. See Elizabeth J. Samuels, Stories Out of School: Teaching the Case of Brown v. Voss, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1445, 1504–08 (1995); Spencer, supra note 13, at 2033 n.357. 
 45. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 104–05 (1988) 
(referring to what the text calls “policy justification” as “social congruence.”); FREDERICK 
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best problems to discuss in class, or to put on an exam, involve policy or rules 
that produce unsatisfactory results. A student’s developing judgment in 
identifying a remedy and arguing for it helps to reconcile incongruities in 
policy, rule, and result. 
Another skill that Remedies fosters is characterization between substantive 
categories of law.46 A centaur is a mythical creature with a human torso 
mounted on a horse’s body. Should the hypothetical ticket agent sell the 
centaur a passenger ticket or load him in the large-animal car? For a more 
realistic example, Remedies students have had both Torts and Contracts in 
their first year. A plaintiff will usually argue that “this is a tort” because a tort 
may yield punitive damages and emotional distress damages, while the 
defendant will argue for contract and lower exposure. “The tort action,” 
Milsom wrote, “was now being consciously manipulated to do the contract 
job.”47 A student will also learn this important skill along with its 
argumentative and analytical technique in Conflicts of Laws. 
A Remedies student’s most obvious benefit from the Remedies course is 
its application in the profession after law school. Less obvious are the skills of 
self-education and judgment, for Remedies people often know how things will 
work out and how to get there. The principal benefit of classroom teaching for 
the teacher is to be paid for learning, for curiosity. 
What do you do after Remedies class is over? 
III.  TEACHING REMEDIES OUTSIDE THE CLASSROOM 
The classroom is the law professor’s basic bailiwick. I reject the canard 
that the only faculty time devoted to instruction occurs in the classroom. 
Teaching versus scholarship is a false opposition. Teaching feeds on research, 
research grows out of teaching. Developing and disseminating new knowledge 
is built into a professor’s job. In addition to preparing before class and 
reviewing after, research-driven teaching includes scholarship, pro bono, and 
perhaps consulting. 
I cannot separate my Remedies classroom teaching from developing a 
Remedies casebook and teacher’s manual.48 I combine my daily teaching cycle 
with my several-year casebook-revision cycles. When a new edition of the 
casebook is published, the publisher sends me a word-processing version to 
download. I develop the next edition of the casebook and the teacher’s manual 
together. I may read my assignment on the computer screen or in the physical 
 
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED 
DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 93–100 (1991) (referring to “substantive justifications”). 
 46. See, e.g., RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 22, at 644–72 (explaining the difference 
between tort and contract remedies). 
 47. S. F. C. MILSOM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 45 (2003). 
 48. The latest version is RENDLEMAN & ROBERTS, supra note 22. 
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book. After each class, I turn to my computer to correct any errors and 
suppress any infelicities in the “rough draft” of the next edition. Then I polish 
and improve it and make notes to return to later. I print the teacher’s manual, 
mark it up while preparing for class, use it for class notes in class, and revise 
the computer version of it after class. If I have a potential new principal case, I 
print and photocopy it to try out on my class. 
The subject matter of Remedies is as varied as it is difficult. Beginning and 
experienced Remedies teachers often mention uncertainty about the related 
substantive subjects that give rise to the various remedies.49 The Remedies 
smorgasbord’s other side is that one of the concealed benefits of teaching 
Remedies is being curious and interested in learning about everything. 
This leads me to mention some of my ideas about a scholarly agenda for 
Remedies. Many topics in Remedies are intrinsically difficult and don’t yield 
clear answers. This difficulty is apparent in basic distinctions like civil 
contempt versus criminal contempt and law versus equity. Misreadings of the 
Supreme Court’s contempt decisions, as in International Union, United Mine 
Workers of America v. Bagwell,50 for example, are palpable.51 
The nadir of the United States Supreme Court’s law-equity confusion may 
be Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.52 The Court read “equitable relief” in the 
ERISA statute to “refer to those categories of relief that were typically 
available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not 
compensatory damages).”53 One of the Court’s “typical” examples is simply 
incorrect, for mandamus is legal relief.54 A second is half-incorrect and 
misleading, for restitution has both legal and equitable forms,55 legal being the 
more important. Finally, the idea that compensatory damages were not 
“typically available in equity” may also be inaccurate since chancery courts 
frequently awarded a successful plaintiff compensatory damages.56 
Discretion in decision-making is a fertile field for inquiry. Careful scholars 
have published several well-researched and well-reasoned articles calling for 
 
 49. See Susan A. Channick, Learning to Teach Remedies, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 685, 686 
(2001); Gregory L. Ogden, Challenges in Teaching Remedies, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 611, 611 (2001). 
 50. 512 U.S. 821 (1994). 
 51. See Livingston, supra note 2, at 390–99; Ressler, supra note 2, at 376. 
 52. 508 U.S. 248 (1993). 
 53. Id. at 256. 
 54. See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”: The Supreme Court’s Trail 
of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2003); Colleen 
P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU L. REV. 1577, 1614 (2002). 
 55. See Langbein, supra note 54, at 1354; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1614. 
 56. See Langbein, supra note 54, at 1350–51; Murphy, supra note 54, at 1615; Tracy A. 
Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2003). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] REMEDIES: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 579 
discretion in equity.57 Their proposals are nevertheless sobering for realists 
about human nature like this one.58 
Following publication in 2011 of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment, many Remedies instructors turned their attention to 
disseminating the knowledge that the restatement process had developed. That 
turned out to be a vast open field for future effort. In 2012, for example, in 
Georgia Malone & Co. v. Rieder,59 the Court of Appeals of New York decided 
a quantum meruit restitution case without mentioning either quantum meruit or 
restitution. The court mistakenly added a new element to the plaintiff’s claim 
for restitution: a direct relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.60 
The direct relationship prerequisite may stem from the court’s borrowing a 
crypto-privity “awareness” concept from the law of contracts and adding it to 
restitution, where it doesn’t belong. The court also randomly mingled legal 
restitution, quantum meruit, with equitable restitution, the constructive trust.61 
We should expect better from the highest court in our principal commercial 
state. The New York court’s troublesome Georgia Malone decision will be 
likely to obfuscate professional understanding of restitution for decades. A 
further example of the primitive level of professional understanding of basic 
restitution principles is that the summary of the decision in my daily email 
from the Association of Corporate Counsel referred to the blunder as a 
clarification.62 
 
 57. See, e.g., T. Leigh Anenson, Beyond Chafee: A Process-Based Theory of Unclean 
Hands, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 509 (2010); T. Leigh Anenson & Donald O. Mayer, “Clean Hands” 
and the CEO: Equity as an Antidote for Excessive Compensation, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 947 
(2010); T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. 
63 (2010); T. Leigh Anenson, Treating Equity Like Law: A Post-Merger Justification of Unclean 
Hands, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 455 (2008); Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary 
Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2003). 
 58. My own treatment of discretion is in Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable 
Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63 (2007). 
 59. 19 N.Y.3d 511 (N.Y. 2012). 
 60. See id. at 519. 
 61. See id. at 518–19. I examined the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment sections one and two and found nothing to support the court’s decision. Restitution 
needs some kind of remoteness/proximate cause cutoff, but an “awareness” relationship is not 
close to the right one. The 2011 Restatement grants unjust enrichment and the cause of action, but 
adjusts measurement of restitution if profits are remote. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51cmt. f (2011). Other cutoff possibilities are 
defendant’s intent, causation, and foreseeability, all usually bearing on measurement of 
restitution, not the defendant’s initial liability. See generally Mark P. Gergen, Causation in 
Disgorgement, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 827 (2012). 
 62. Thomas Michael & Rena Andoh, Court of Appeals Clarifies Standard for Unjust 
Enrichment, LEXOLOGY (Ass’n of Corporate Counsel, Washington DC), July 16, 2012, available 
at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4957bc4a-a60c-4d42-8732-f23aed96c4bb. 
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A beginning Remedies instructor might scan the gap between the 2011 
Restatement of Restitution and Georgia Malone, as well as decisions like it, 
and decide that explaining and criticizing the Restatement and bridging the 
professional gap might comprise an interesting and productive scholarly 
agenda.63 
The transitions between compensating the plaintiff with damages, 
disgorgement restitution based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment, and 
punishment through punitive damages could also profit from further 
examination. Not thinking that my 2011 Washington and Lee article should be 
the last word on this subject,64 I commend the topic to others. 
The grey areas between remedies could be better mapped than they are. In 
eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court defined the injunction-damages 
border in ways that this Remedies scholar and others find wanting.65 In 
addition, damages versus injunctions as remedies for a defendant’s nuisance 
are the subject of a longstanding debate complete with an extensive literature, 
one that I am examining in another article.66 
Plaintiffs’ personal injury litigation is financed by contingency fee 
contracts and fed by pain and suffering damages.67 A plaintiff’s recovery for 
nonpecuniary interests, pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, 
and lost dignity will remain a controversial topic on Remedies scholars’ 
damages agenda. A judge or jury has difficulty measuring nonpecuniary 
damages and striking a “just” balance between penury and excess (windfall, if 
you like). Since a plaintiff does not encounter these injuries in money, the 
judge or jury has difficulty translating them into money. Accordingly, 
defendants fear unpredictable and potentially crushing damages verdicts. Most 
 
 63. In his indispensable review of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment, Doug Laycock recommended that law schools add a course in Restitution. Douglas 
Laycock, Restoring Restitution to the Canon, 110 MICH. L. REV. 929, 951–52 (2012); see also 
Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713, 714 
(2013) (advocating for institutions to support the teaching of both Remedies and Restitution). 
 64. Doug Rendleman, Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with 
Compensatory Damages and Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2011). 
 65. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL 
REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 86 (2010); Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The 
Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 203 (2012); Douglas Laycock, Introduction to Remedies: Justice and the Bottom Line, 27 
REV. LITIG. 1, 4 (2007). 
 66. Doug Rendleman, Rejecting Property Rules-Liability Rules for Boomer’s Nuisance 
Remedy: The Last Tour You Need of Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral (Washington & Lee 
Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2013-02, 2013), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2212384. 
 67. See Stephen D. Sugarman, A Comparative Law Look at Pain and Suffering Awards, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 399, 401 (2006). 
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tort reform is personal injury damages reform.68 The best examples are caps on 
plaintiffs’ “noneconomic” or pain and suffering damages. Remedies 
professors’ responsible scholarship will play a constructive role in these legal 
developments. 
Another developing area of damages law is a plaintiff’s recovery of 
nonpecuniary damages for a defendant’s negligent injury to the plaintiff’s 
personal property. One example, a plaintiff’s recovery for her lost pet, involves 
a variation on the characterization discussed above. For if the court 
characterizes a plaintiff’s pet as property, it will bar her from recovering 
emotional distress damages. Because of the changing role of domestic animals 
from a working dog, such as a cattle- or sheep-herding collie, to a pet, the city-
suburban dweller’s adorable companion animal, this rule is unstable. Below 
are two recent examples. 
First, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, classifying a dog as property, 
rejected recovery of emotional distress damages by a pet owner who had 
watched her pet being killed by the defendant’s dog.69 Second, though a 
Michigan court allowed a homeowner to recover mental anguish damages from 
the defendant’s negligent destruction of her home, the court, not very 
convincingly, distinguished a no-recovery rule for personal property, a pet, 
from a recovery rule for real property.70 These are articles waiting to be 
written. 
Remedies scholars might profitably examine remedies beyond damages, 
injunctions, and restitution. May the court order a defendant to apologize?71 A 
forced apology is probably a form of injunction. Professor Sam Bray has 
written useful articles on declaratory judgment and predetermined remedies.72 
Only law professors specialize in Remedies as an overarching topic. 
Lawyers specialize in substantive areas along with the remedies in that area. A 
lawyer, high in her specialized silo, often doesn’t understand the law outside. 
When lawyers wander out of their specialties, they are frequently lost in a 
remedial wilderness. One consequence is that “[l]itigators,” as Laycock wrote, 
“would benefit from consulting remedies specialists more often than they 
do.”73 
 
 68. Julie Davies, Reforming the Tort Reform Agenda, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 119, 131 
(2007). 
 69. McDougall v. Lamm, 48 A.3d 312, 314 (N.J. 2012). 
 70. See Price v. High Pointe Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d 583, 590–91 (Mich. Ct. App. 2011). 
 71. See generally Robyn Carroll, Beyond Compensation: Apology as a Private Law Remedy, 
in THE LAW OF REMEDIES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE COMMON LAW 323 (Jeff Berryman & Rick 
Bigwood eds., 2010); Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil 
Rights Remedy, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1261 (2006). 
 72. See Samuel L. Bray, Announcing Remedies, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 753 (2012); Samuel L. 
Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (2010). 
 73. Laycock, supra note 12, at 167. 
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The statutory penalty, which is a common remedy in consumer protection 
and other statutes, provides me with a transition from scholarship to pro bono 
service. In Edwards v. First American Corp.,74 defendants argued that 
plaintiffs who sued them for statutory penalties but who lacked compensatory 
damages had no “injury in fact,” a prerequisite for Article III standing to sue in 
United States court.75 On the final day of its term, after receiving briefs, 
including over twenty-five amicus briefs, and hearing oral argument, the 
Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.76 One of those 
amicus briefs was a pro bono brief on behalf of restitution scholars who had 
concluded that the self-interested litigants lacked a sophisticated understanding 
of restitution. The brief explained the adverse effect on restitution of a decision 
that accepted defendant’s argument.77 Watching legal developments and 
putting in a pro bono oar where remedies-related subjects are at issue might 
lead to more widespread professional knowledge of remedies and prevent 
judicial blunders like eBay v. MercExchange.78 
I am usually engaged in one or more consulting relationships on issues 
directly related to Remedies. Most of these are pro bono, some aren’t. 
Consulting in moderation reminds a professor what is actually happening in 
law practice. One thing I have learned over and over is that knowledge and 
research in Remedies subjects is sometimes remarkably thin. This is 
particularly true in restitution. Almost every article written about restitution by 
a Remedies professor includes a variation on the Restatement (Third) Reporter 
Andrew Kull’s lament: 
Confusion over the content of restitution carries significant adverse 
consequences. To put it bluntly, American lawyers today (judges and law 
professors included) do not know what restitution is . . . . The technical 
competence of published opinions in straightforward restitution cases has 
noticeably declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments 
of the doctrine even when they know where to find it.79 
 
 74. 610 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 75. Id. at 516–17. 
 76. First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 132 S. Ct. 2536, 2537 (2012). 
 77. Brief of Reporter & Advisers to Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 31–34, First Am. Fin. Corp. v. Edwards 
132 S. Ct. 2536 (2012) (No. 10-708). 
 78. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 79. Andrew Kull, Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995). John 
McCamus writes that restitution is also not known well enough in Canada. See John D. 
McCamus, Unjust Enrichment, “Existing Categories” and Kerr v. Baranow: A Reply to Professor 
McInnes, 52 CAN. BUS. L.J. 390, 393, 414 (2012). 
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Even non-restitution scholars recognize that Kull’s arrow hits the bull’s-eye.80 
The Court of Appeals of New York’s lamentable decision in Georgia Malone 
& Co. v. Rieder is grim confirmation of the impression that repeating 
Restitution 101 is sometimes necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
I began by directing my attention to the charge that law school doesn’t 
prepare its students for practice. 
Even though I have taught practical litigation courses and have published a 
practice-oriented book for Virginia lawyers,81 I spent several of the formative 
years of my law-teaching career at William & Mary, home to the nation’s first 
law school. In 1779, a tyro could learn the practice of law by apprenticeship 
with an experienced lawyer.82 Thomas Jefferson founded the law school at 
William & Mary in 1779 to educate political leaders to serve the new nation 
that he expected to emerge from the ongoing revolution.83 I can’t get over the 
idea that a law school should work with its eyes up. 
A discussion- and problem-oriented course in Remedies prepares a student 
for the analysis, negotiation, litigation, and decision-making of law practice 
without abandoning the Jeffersonian ideal. 
On another plane, the legal profession is diverse and specialized.84 Change 
is rapid and unpredictable. When I graduated from law school a few years ago, 
no one would have predicted the rise of the computer, globalization, or the 
effect of both on the legal profession. One courthouse’s culture doesn’t carry 
over to another’s. How much of our education was training in yesterday’s 
practice? 
I don’t think of education for instantaneous practicality, for hitting the 
ground running on the first day on the job. Nor do I think of education merely 
to develop a student’s “human capital.” John Dewey noted in 1897 that 
“[g]iven the pace of change, it is impossible . . . to know what the world will 
be like in a couple of decades, so schools first and foremost should teach us 
habits of learning.”85 
 
 80. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates: Remedying 
Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract = 2117989. 
 81. DOUG RENDLEMAN, ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND LIENS IN VIRGINIA (2d ed. 
1994). 
 82. See Brian J. Moline, Early American Legal Education, 42 WASHBURN L.J. 775, 780–81, 
784 (2004). 
 83. See Davison M. Douglas, Opening Remarks: Symposium, The Restyled Federal Rules of 
Evidence, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1435, 1437 (2012). 
 84. See MORGAN, supra note 14, at 208, 210–11. 
 85. See Michael S. Roth, Learning as Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A23; see also 
Dan Berrett, Habits of Mind: Lessons for the Long Term, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 12, 2012, 
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My goals in writing these lines are more modest than Maimonides’s in The 
Guide for the Perplexed, who wrote that “[m]y object in adopting this 
arrangement is that the truths should be at one time apparent, and at another 
time concealed.”86 Nevertheless, the “law” and practice of Remedies is 
complex, even messy. It cannot be captured in a unified account. Beyond the 
pragmatic operation of the adversary system in a federal government, anyone 
who seeks an overarching theory to explain or drive Remedies will seek in 
vain. Returning to Archilochus’s observation in my introduction that “[t]he fox 
knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing,”87 I will close 
where I began: Remedies is the law of the fox. I commend it to you. 
 
 
at A1 (presenting the argument that the real value of a college education is learning habits of 
mind). 
 86. MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 3 (M. Friedlander trans., 2d ed. 
1947). 
 87. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
